Low corporate taxes can help attract new …rms. This is the main mechanism underpinning the standard 'race-to-the-bottom'view of tax competition. A recent theoretical literature has quali…ed this view by formalizing the argument that agglomeration forces can reduce …rms' sensitivity to tax di¤erentials across locations. We test this proposition using data on …rm startups across Swiss municipalities. We …nd that, on average, high corporate income taxes do deter new …rms, but that this relationship is signi…cantly weaker in the most spatially concentrated sectors. Location choices of …rms in sectors with an agglomeration intensity at the twentieth percentile of the sample distribution are estimated to be twice as responsive to a given di¤erence in local corporate tax burdens as …rms in sectors with an agglomeration intensity at the eightieth percentile. Hence, our analysis con…rms the theoretical prediction: agglomeration economies can neutralize the impact of tax di¤erentials on …rms'location choices.
Introduction
According to the standard model of tax competition, increasing mobility of …rms induces a race to the bottom in corporate taxes. 1 Recent theoretical work has fundamentally questioned the relevance of this scenario. In most 'new economic geography' models, the strength of geographical agglomeration forces increases as goods and factors become more mobile. As a result, somewhat paradoxically, the scope for attracting …rms through …scal inducements could in fact shrink as technological and administrative obstacles to …rm mobility are reduced. The existence of agglomeration forces could thus allow governments to continue to tax corporate income even once capital has in principle become highly mobile.
We provide an empirical veri…cation of the hypothesis that agglomeration forces can o¤set di¤erences in corporate taxes as a determinant of …rm location. Estimating location choice models for …rm start-ups across Swiss municipalities, we …nd that high corporate taxes are indeed a deterrent to …rm location, but that this deterrent e¤ect is signi…cantly weaker for sectors that are more spatially clustered. Hence, agglomeration economies -be they due to externalities or to spatially concentrated endowments -can reduce the ability (and incentive) of jurisdictions to compete for …rms via strategically low tax rates.
These results are based on Poisson regressions derived from …rm-level pro…t functions in a location choice model. We …rst estimate a 'baseline model'of …rms'location choices, in which we introduce an explicit interaction term between municipal corporate taxes and a measure of sector-level agglomeration. In an alternative approach, we then estimate a 'speci…c model' that is formally derived from a model of spatial demand and supply conditions. In that model, the relative e¤ect of taxes versus agglomeration forces features implicitly rather than via an explicit interaction term. We minimize simultaneity problems between taxes and …rm location by using sector-level counts of new …rms as the dependent variable, and municipal corporate taxes which apply identically to …rms across all sectors as the independent variable.
Unobserved sector characteristics are controlled for via …xed e¤ects, and the qualitative results are shown to be robust across a range of speci…cations and at di¤erent levels of sectoral aggregation.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the relevant literature. Section 3 presents the two estimable models. Our empirical setting and data set are described in 1 For a comprehensive review of this literature, see Wilson (1999) . Borck and P ‡üger (2006, p. 663 ), the 'delocation elasticity'is widely found to be negative.
Starting with Carlton (1983) , numerous studies have estimated conditional logit models of …rms'location choices. 7 The conditional logit model has the advantage of being formally derived from a …rm's stochastic pro…t function, but it becomes computationally demanding for estimation of models with individual data and large numbers of locational alternatives. Papke (1991) therefore suggests that location choice could also be represented by a region-level count model, such that estimation is based on maximum likelihood with an assumed Poisson distribution. 8 The Poisson model is shown by Guimaraes, Figueiredo and Woodward (2003) to be formally equivalent to the conditional logit model with grouped data and group-speci…c …xed e¤ects. We can therefore estimate the conditional logit model via Poisson, taking sectors as the grouping variable.
To our knowledge, only Devereux, Gri¢ th and Simpson (2007) have previously explored the impact of agglomeration economies on the sensitivity to local …scal incentives of …rms' location choices. 9 They estimate a conditional logit model of plant location in Great Britain, including an interaction term of region-level …scal incentives with the stock of pre-existing same-sector plants in the relevant region; and they …nd that …scal incentives have a greater impact on attracting plants in regions with large stocks of existing plants. As …scal incentives in British regions are negotiated individually for each proposed new establishment, unobserved plant-level features might a¤ect both the probability of a plant receiving a grant in a particular area and the probability of it locating in that area. Since statutory corporate taxes of Swiss regions are neither …rm-nor sector-speci…c, our empirical setting does not present the estimation challenge a¤ecting an analysis of the same question based on British regional grants.
Our analysis is novel in two additional ways, both motivated by a quest to tie our estimations closely to the theory. First, in our baseline speci…cation, we focus on the interaction 7 Recent applications include Guimaraes, Figueiredo and Woodward (2000) , Figueiredo, Guimaraes and Woodward (2002) , Crozet, Mayer and Mucchielli (2004) , Head and Mayer (2004) , Strauss-Kahn and Vives (2005) , and Devereux, Gri¢ th and Simpson (2007) . 8 Count models of …rm location have subsequently been estimated by List (2001) , Guimaraes, Figueiredo an Woodward (2004) , and Holl (2004) . 9 We are aware of two other empirical studies that address the link between agglomeration and local taxation. In an analysis of the determinants of …rm births in Catalonia, Solé-Ollé and Jofre-Monseny (2007) estimate the impact of local taxes with and without including controls for local agglomeration economies. They …nd that without controlling for agglomeration, the estimated e¤ect of local business tax rates on …rm births turns positive, which suggests that these taxes are positively correlated with local agglomeration measures. Charlot and Paty (2007) report that French municipalities with greater market potentials charge higher local business tax rates. of taxes with a sector -speci…c measure of agglomeration, in order to capture the essence of the new economic geography insight on tax competition. 10 As long as taxes vary within the bounds beyond which they would trigger discrete ('catastrophic') relocations of mobile sectors, the theory consistently suggests that stronger sector-level agglomeration forces imply a smaller delocation elasticity. 11 Second, in addition to a somewhat ad hoc 'baseline model' similar to those that have typically been estimated in this literature, we construct a 'speci…c model'as a representative …rm's pro…t function that is formally derived from explicitly modeled spatial demand and supply conditions. The speci…c model implies that interaction terms on the tax variable are not in fact warranted, but it still allows us to compute the relative importance of taxes versus agglomeration forces in determining location choices.
Models of location choice

A baseline model: footloose and latent startups
At the most general level, there are two approaches to modeling the location of new …rms.
One approach is to consider an investor who has resolved to set up a …rm somewhere among a given set of locations and then decides which location to pick. We refer to this as the 'footloose startup'model. 12 The other approach is to assume that potential entrepreneurs are spatially immobile and continuously decide whether or not to set up a …rm. 13 We refer to this approach as the 'latent startup'model. To the empirical researcher, these two approaches are equivalent in two essential respects: the decision to set up a …rm at a particular location is based in both cases on expected pro…ts, and in both cases expected pro…ts are best modelled 1 0 Devereux et al. (2007) , using a location-speci…c measure, show that it may be cheaper to attract a new plant to an existing cluster than to a peripheral location. This is an important and evidently policy-relevant result, but not what the theory necessarily predicts when the economy is in spatial equilibrium. In an interior spatial equilibrium with no relocation costs, expected pro…ts at the locus of agglomeration (the 'central' location) and at the periphery are equalized. Whether a given change in …scal inducements is then more e¤ective at attracting …rms to a central or to a peripheral location is indeterminate, as it depends on the functional form of the relationship between real returns and industry shares across locations. In the simulations reported by Borck and P ‡üger (2006, Fig. 5 ), a given …scal inducement will attract a larger number of …rms if o¤ered at the peripheral location than if o¤ered at the central location. 1 1 In 'core-periphery' models, which, in the absence of taxes, accommodate only perfectly agglomerated or perfectly dispersed spatial allocations of the mobile sector, marginal variations in relative tax burdens imply marginal reallocations of that sector among locations in the dispersed equilibrium but have no e¤ect on sectoral location in the agglomerated equilibrium (see, e.g., Baldwin et al., 2003) . In models that accommodate partially agglomerated con…gurations even in the absence of taxes, more strongly agglomerated equilibria imply lower delocation elasticities (Borck and P ‡üger, 2006) . 1 2 This approach underlies the empirical literature on location choices using the conditional logit model. 1 3 See, e.g., Becker and Henderson (2000) and Figueiredo et al. (2002) .
as a combination of deterministic components and a stochastic term.
We posit a general pro…t function for a footloose-startup decision problem, where a …rm has decided to set up a new plant f belonging to sector i and now considers which location j
to choose:
U ij summarizes the deterministic part of the pro…t function that is common to …rms of a particular sector and at a particular location; T j represents the relevant corporate tax burden at location j; A i represents the strength of agglomeration economies in sector i; x ij is a vector of other variables that determine a …rm's pro…ts in sector i at location j (such as factor prices, proximity to markets, etc.); 1 ; 2 ; 3 and are coe¢ cients to be estimated; and
" f ij is a stochastic error term. Sectors' propensity to agglomerate, A i , may be determined by pecuniary and/or technological spillovers, or it may be due to the spatial concentration of immobile resources that are important to sector i. What matters is that the locational advantages at the locus of agglomeration are at least partly internalized by …rms.
Our interest is in the parameter 3 : while we expect the attractiveness of a location j to fall in the level of its corporate tax burden, implying that 1 should be negative, this sensitivity should be weaker in sectors that are subject to strong agglomeration forces. A positive 3 would therefore con…rm the result of the economic geography literature that agglomeration forces can o¤set industries'sensitivity to tax di¤erentials.
If we treat the location decision problem as one of random pro…t maximization, …rm f will pick location m if f im > f ij 8 j; j 6 = m. As shown by McFadden (1974) , the assumption that " f ij has an extreme-value type 1 distribution yields a simple expression for the probability of choosing location m: Speci…cally, we can rewrite the random pro…t model (1) equivalently as follows:
where n ij follows a Poisson distribution and d i is a set of sector dummies. The inclusion of sector dummies forces the control matrix x ij to consist exclusively of variables that vary across locations. The main e¤ect of A i , 2 , is absorbed into the sector …xed e¤ects.
The latent-startup model assumes that every location hosts a certain number of immobile (2) . By employing Poisson estimation, we can therefore accommodate both the footloose and the latent startup models -a considerable advantage given that it would be impossible based on available statistics to judge which of the two models represents a better approximation of the actual data-generating process.
A speci…c model for footloose startups
While the model of expected pro…ts in equation (1) may be intuitive and general, it is not rooted in a formal representation of the …rm's optimization problem. We now derive a pro…t function formally, drawing on a simple model proposed by Crozet, Mayer and Mucchielli (2004) . This will lead to a particular speci…cation of the pro…t function that can be viewed as an alternative to equation (1), thus o¤ering a complementary framework for the exploration of our basic research question.
We assume identical consumer preferences across locations j but allow for variations in income and price elasticities of demand across sectors i. A generalized Cobb-Douglas utility function then implies the following expression for quantity demanded Q ij :
where i is the sectoral expenditure share, m j is relevant income at location j, p ij is the price, i is the income elasticity, and i > 1 is the price elasticity of demand.
Symmetry among …rms of any sector at a particular location implies that quantity demanded, and thus equilibrium output per …rm, are equalized:
where N ij is the number of active …rms in sector i at location j.
Firms are assumed to be price takers in factor markets. Their unit costs are modeled as follows:
where w ij is the wage rate (which may vary across locations and industries), k is the capital rental price (assumed constant across locations and industries), r j is land rental price (which may vary across locations), t w j is the payroll tax rate (to the extent that it is borne by employers), t k j is the capital tax rate, t r j is the property tax rate, A i again captures agglomeration economies, and the s are parameters. w i , k i , and r i represent input shares of labor, capital and land. The exponent on N ij , ( N + A i ), implies that …rms in more agglomerated sectors will bene…t more from proximity to own-sector …rms than …rms in less agglomerated sectors.
Pro…ts of a representative …rm can be written as ij = (1 t j ) (p ij c ij ) q ij , where t j is the corporate income (i.e. pro…t) tax rate. Pro…t maximization with a large number of …rms competing in quantities, and consideration of a multiplicative stochastic term f ij , implies the following …rm-level pro…t function: 14
ij f ij : In logs, this becomes:
We can thus write the following estimable equation:
where the i are absorbed by sector …xed e¤ects ( 1i ), and property taxes t r j are dropped as they do not play a role in our empirical setting. 15 If we assume that ln f ij follows an i.i.d.
extreme-value type 1 distribution, equation (5) leads to a standard conditional logit model and can be estimated, mutatis mutandis, via a Poisson count model analogous to (2) . 16 The principal di¤erence between the baseline model (2) and the speci…c model (5) is that the latter no longer features an explicit interaction term between the corporate income tax burden and sectoral agglomeration intensity. This stems from the simple fact that a given statutory tax rate on pro…ts reduces pro…ts exactly proportionally irrespective of any sectoral 1 5 The pro…t function (4) implies that 2 = 1. This restriction, however, cannot be tested, because the coe¢ cients of a multinomial choice model are identi…ed only up to a multiplicative scale factor. Strictly, (4) also implies that 3i = 6i , i.e. that the e¤ect of a percentage change in wages is equivalent to that of a percentage change in the tax on wages. We shall not impose this restriction, because (a) we observe taxes on personal income (whose incidence on …rms'wage bills we cannot measure) and (b) our data for wages and for personal income taxes are at di¤erent spatial scales. Moreover, for expositional simplicity we shall report results with 5i , 6i , 7i , and 8i each constrained to be equal across sectors, i.e. we assume the e¤ects of taxes on factor inputs and the main e¤ect of Nij (which we shall represent by the empirical variable sector proximity ) to be the same across sectors. To the extent that they are possible, estimations with sector-level e¤ects of these variables yield qualitatively equivalent results to those reported below. Given the very limited time variation in our data, separate identi…cation of 7i , and 8i is not feasible. 1 6 Silva and Tenreyro (2006) show that the Poisson estimator is particularly well suited to log-linear regression speci…cations that are derived from multiplicative models with potentially heteroskedastic error terms. or locational speci…cities. Hence, we shall compute an indirect "tax-versus-agglomeration effect"for the speci…c model, based on the magnitude of the estimated tax sensitivity parameter 2 relative to the magnitude of the estimated agglomeration sensitivity parameters 7 and 8 .
Estimation issues
Scaling
In estimating our models (2) and (5), we need to take account of the fact that real-world locations come in di¤erent geographic sizes, giving them di¤erent probabilities of attracting or generating a certain number of new …rms even once their purely economic characteristics are accounted for. Failure to control for size di¤erences could thus lead to omitted-variable bias.
We can think of our locations j as consisting of L j equally sized 'lots'`2 L j . Characteristics of individual lots are only observed (or are only relevant) at the level of locations.
Assume a conditional logit model at the level of lots. The pro…t function for …rm f associated with lot`in location j (suppressing industry-level notation) is given by f`= U f j + " f`, where " f`i s independent across f and`and follows an extreme-value type 1 distribution. Note that the deterministic part U f j is equal across lots within location j. Then the probability that …rm f chooses a lot in location m is given by
:
This is equivalent to a conditional logit model at the level of locations with pro…t function 
where the constant lot size only a¤ects the intercept of the deterministic partŨ f j = U f j lns.
We therefore include usable land area as a control variable in all our estimated regressions.
Taken literally, expression (6) suggests that the coe¢ cient on log area should be equal to one.
We shall test the robustness of our results to the formal imposition of this restriction in the speci…c model.
Unobserved location-speci…c e¤ects
In the context of location choice modelling, Poisson estimation allows the researcher to adhere rigorously to the random pro…t-function model. It does not, however, relax the 'independence of irrelevant alternatives' (IIA) assumption, which arguably represents the major drawback of the conditional logit approach. IIA implies that stochastic terms are independent across locations. This assumption is violated if there are relevant location-speci…c characteristics that are spatially correlated but unobserved by the econometrician. A useful palliative is to include location-speci…c …xed e¤ects, controlling for all unobserved location-speci…c characteristics (Guimaraes et al., 2004 ). Our baseline model (2) thus becomes:
where d j is a set of location dummies. This approach no longer allows identi…cation of coe¢ cients on purely location-speci…c characteristics such as T j . Since we are interested in this e¤ect as well as in coe¢ cients on certain other certain purely location-speci…c variables, we estimate our models both with and without location-speci…c …xed e¤ects, taking the former as robustness tests for the latter.
Overdispersion and excess zeroes
The estimable Poisson model is formally derived from the underlying pro…t functions. This establishes a direct link between theory and empirics. The Poisson model implies that the expected count, ij , is equal to the variance of n ij . This is typically a strong assumption in empirical applications, as the variance often exceeds the expected count (overdispersion), and as economic data often feature a larger number of zero observations than that implied by the Poisson distribution. 17 We address these issues in two ways. For the standard …xed-e¤ects panel Poisson estimates we additionally report robust standard errors, and we estimate zero-in ‡ated panel Poisson. 18 4 The empirical setting 4 
.1 Local taxation in Switzerland
We base our estimations on data for Switzerland. For a number of reasons, the Swiss …scal system provides an ideal laboratory in which to examine our research question.
Swiss sub-federal jurisdictions enjoy almost complete autonomy in the determination of their tax rates, and, as a consequence, we observe large variations in tax burdens even within the small area covered by Switzerland. 19 The Swiss federation consists of three government layers (federal, cantonal and municipal), with each jurisdictional level collecting a roughly similar share of total tax revenue.
In the Swiss …scal system, corporate taxation is mainly the remit of sub-federal jurisdictions. Cantons and municipalities collect around 65 percent of the total tax income raised on corporate income and capital, the remaining 35 being raised by the federal government.
Hence, di¤erences in corporate taxes across cantons and municipalities matter, and they are large. Figure 1 illustrates this point for consolidated cantonal-plus-municipal corporate income taxes on pro…ts of a representative …rm with a 2 percent return on capital: the highest tax rate, at 14.1 percent, is almost seven times higher than the lowest rate, at 2.1 percent.
Another advantage of the Swiss system is that corporate taxation is based on legally binding statutory rates that depend solely on …rms'pro…tability and capital base. Statutory rates apply identically across sectors and …rms. Di¤erences in tax burdens across municipalities and cantons can therefore be considered as exogenously given from the point of view of individual …rms. Since identical tax treatment applies across sectors, and our data allow for analysis at the level of narrow sectors, we can also abstract from the possibility that the intensity of spatial concentration in certain sectors could be in ‡uenced by the level and spatial distribution of corporate tax burdens. 20 
Data sources
We draw on data from three main sources.
First, the Swiss Federal Statistical O¢ ce has collected information on every newly created …rm annually since 1999. 21 The main use of this data set is as the source of new …rm counts per municipality and economic sector (n ij ), our dependent variable. We use data for the years 1999-2002. This database o¤ers information on the municipality in which the new …rm is located and on the …rm's main sector of activity in terms of the two-, three-and fourdigit sectors of the European NACE classi…cation system. 22 The data set records as new …rms all market-oriented business entities that have been founded in the year concerned and are operating for at least 20 hours per week. New entities created by mergers, takeovers or breakups are not counted. A foreign …rm's …rst Swiss branch, however, counts as a new …rm. Observed …rm start-ups undoubtedly represent a mixture of births through resident entrepreneurs best modelled by the latent-startup approach and of births by non-resident (Swiss or foreign) investors best modelled by the footloose-startup approach.
Our second source of data is the multiannual census of all …rms located in Switzerland, also carried out by the Federal Statistical O¢ ce. We use data for the surveys of 1998 and 2001, containing information on location, sector of activity and employment, to construct our agglomeration variables.
Finally, we have assembled a municipality-level dataset on local taxes and other control variables from a variety of sources. 23 We use these data for our measures of corporate and income tax burdens, factor prices, public expenditure, and proximity to markets. The data were collected for 1998 and 2001, covering the 213 largest municipalities. The mean population of our sample municipalities is 17,367, for a mean total area of 20.2 square kilometers. 24 2 0 For models of endogenous agglomeration, driven in part by taxation patterns, see e.g. Ottaviano and van Ypersele (2005), and Hau ‡er and Wooton (2007). 2 1 The statistical o¢ ce's title for this project is "Unternehmensdemogra…e" (UDEMO). 2 2 We retain only sectors that pertain to the private sector. Furthermore, sectors for which no …rm births are observed in either year are dropped from the dataset. This leaves us with 41 sectors at the two-digit level, 133 sectors at the three-digit level, and 242 sectors at the four-digit level. 2 3 For a detailed description of the data on municipal taxes and other municipal attributes, see Brülhart and Jametti (2006) . 2 4 Due to the small size of our sample jurisdictions, we feel con…dent in abstracting from within-juristictional heterogeneity. Duranton, Gobillon and Overman (2007) provide a careful treatment of this issue based on data for English Local Authorities (which, on average, cover areas that are 18 times larger than our Swiss sample municipalities).
Variables used 4.3.1 Dependent variable
We run all of our regressions for two waves of …rm creations, which we pool while allowing for separate intercepts. 
Explanatory variables: baseline model
Our main explanatory variables in the baseline model (2) are local corporate taxes (T j ), sectoral agglomeration economies (A i ) and, most importantly, the interaction of those two e¤ects.
We represent local corporate taxes via a tax index, a revenue-weighted average of consolidated municipal and cantonal pro…t and capital taxes. The index is calculated separately for 1998 and for 2001. Corporate income tax schedules are progressive in most municipalities. Hence, we collected statutory corporate income tax rates for three representative levels of pro…tability (2, 9 and 32 percent, based on observed distributions of pro…tability levels in Swiss …rm-level statistics), and took the mean of these three rates as an index for the corporate income tax.
As capital taxes are generally proportional, we collected statutory capital tax rates for a …rm with the median capital base. To compute the tax index, we normalized the pro…t-tax index and the capital tax rates by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation for each of the two sample years, and we weighted them by the respective importance in terms of tax revenue. Hence, the tax index has mean zero by construction. 25 Agglomeration economies are not directly observable. In steady state, however, sectors subject to strong agglomeration economies will be more spatially concentrated than sectors subject to weak agglomeration economies (or to net dispersion economies). Hence, we compute spatial concentration indices using the de…nition proposed by Ellison and Glaeser (1997) , which controls for di¤erences in …rm numbers across sectors in quantifying the extent of geographic clustering. We refer to this variable as the EG index. We cannot estimate the main e¤ect of the EG index, due to the inclusion of sector-speci…c …xed e¤ects. Our coe¢ cient of interest in the baseline model (2), however, is 3 , the e¤ect of the interaction between the tax index and the EG index. We compute this interaction by multiplying the two indices after mean-di¤erencing the EG index (the tax index has mean zero by construction). Thereby, the interaction term has a mean of zero, which allows us to interpret the estimated coe¢ cient on the tax index as the e¤ect of taxes for a sector with average spatial concentration.
A number of control variables are included (x ij ). In order to allow for cost factors a¤ecting …rm pro…ts, we control for the prices of labour and of real estate. 26 Wage reports average monthly wages per sector and region, while property price stands for the average selling price of a representative family home. 27 In the baseline model, we interact both these price variables with the EG index, as we may expect equivalent e¤ects of agglomeration economies for the importance of factor prices to those we hypothesize for local tax rates: the stronger are sector-speci…c agglomeration economies, the less sensitive …rms'location decisions should be, other things equal, to di¤erentials in factor prices across municipalities.
As income taxes may a¤ect …rms'location choices in addition to corporate taxes, we also include the variable income tax, which represents the canton-averaged statutory cantonalplus-municipal income tax rate for a median-income representative household. We choose this measure, which is invariant across municipalities within each canton, because distances within cantons are su¢ ciently small to allow easy commuting among municipalities. Hence, income taxes in the particular municipalities where …rms are located would not be the relevant measure. 28 Similarly, we control for public expenditure, computed as canton-averaged municipal-plus-cantonal expenditures on what might be considered the main spending items from the viewpoint of private-sector …rms: education, public safety and transport. Again, selecting only municipality-speci…c expenditure would not represent the relevant variable, as 2 6 We assume that the price of capital is equalized across Swiss municipalities. 2 7 Wage is available from the Swiss national statistical o¢ ce for the year 2000, at a level of sectoral aggregation corresponding roughly to one-digit NACE, and at the level of regions comprising several cantons ("Grossregionen"). It is thus assumed that relative wages are constant over our sample period, among subsectors and within regions. Property price is available from the consultancy …rm Wüest & Partner for the year 2002. It is assumed that relative property prices did not vary signi…cantly over our sample period. Since commercial property prices are not collected at a su¢ cient level of detail for our purpose, we employ prices of private property as the best approximation. 2 8 We have also performed our estimations by replacing the canton-averaged tax rate on a median-income household by (i) the municipal median-income tax rate, (ii) the canton-mean maximum (i.e. high-income) tax rate, and (iii) inversely distance weighted averages of municipal tax rates. All our qualitative results are una¤ected by variations in the de…nition of income tax.
Swiss municipalities are su¢ ciently small to commute to from outside. 29 Proximity to same-sector …rms is the key cost factor stressed in the recent economic geography literature -either as a source of technological spillovers, specialized production factors and intermediate inputs, or as factor a¤ecting the intensity of local competition. We therefore control for sector proximity, by computing separately for each municipality and for 1998 and 2001 the inversely distance weighted number of existing …rms in the relevant sector across all Swiss municipalities. The main demand-side control variable is market potential, which, for each municipality, is de…ned in the conventional way as the inversely distance weighted average income across all Swiss municipalities. 30 As a simple complementary measure, we also include distance to highway, the road distance to the nearest access point to the highway network. This variable, unlike sector proximity and market potential, has the advantage of measuring accessibility without implying that the relevant economic space ends at the national border. Summary statistics on these variables are provided in Table 1 . We furthermore include a dummy variable for assisted municipalities, which are de…ned as lying within a region identi…ed by federal law as eligible for temporary tax exemptions for newly created …rms. 31 Finally, we control for area, for consistent estimation given unequally sized locations (see Section 3.3.1). In de…ning this variable, we consider only built-up and constructible surfaces.
Explanatory variables: speci…c model
Estimation of our speci…c model (5) requires a subset of the variables used in the baseline model, measured in logs. An important di¤erence is that we need to identify the relevant tax rates. We have therefore collected statutory tax rates on representative tax payers for taxes on corporate income (t j ), capital (t k j ) and personal income (t w j ). 32 Since these statutory tax rates may be sensitive to our de…nition of representative tax payers, we also estimate the speci…c model using the tax index described above instead of the statutory rates. the more spatially concentrated a sector, the less …rm births in that sector are deterred by high local corporate taxes (or attracted by low taxes).
Results
Some Preliminary Illustrations
Baseline Model
Parameter estimates with sector …xed e¤ects
We begin by estimating our baseline model including …xed e¤ects for sectors but not for municipalities, which allows us to identify coe¢ cients on municipality-speci…c variables. The …rst panel of Table 2 reports estimates of speci…cation (2) separately for the three levels of sectoral aggregation distinguished in our data. To jump straight to the main result, focusing on the 3-digit and 4-digit regression runs: while, as expected, the coe¢ cient on the tax index is statistically signi…cantly negative, the interaction term with the EG index is statison average over our sample period. tically signi…cantly positive. These estimations therefore con…rm the hypothesis we seek to test: location choices of …rms in more spatially concentrated sectors are less sensitive to tax di¤erentials.
The estimated coe¢ cients on the included control variables largely conform with expectations. We …nd consistently negative coe¢ cients on wage and distance to highway, and positive coe¢ cients on public expenditure, area, sector proximity and market potential. 33 Interactions of wage and property price with the EG index, re ‡ecting the prediction that …rms'sensitivity to factor prices other than taxes is also lessened as they experience stronger co-location economies, return positive estimated coe¢ cients, in line with expectations.
The only unexpected result is that property price appears to a¤ect the rate of …rm creation positively. The most plausible explanation for this result is that property price correlates with unobserved location-speci…c features that are attractive to new …rms but not fully capitalized in property prices. We therefore interpret this result as suggesting omitted variables at the municipality level, which supports our use of alternative estimation strategies that involve the inclusion of municipality-level …xed e¤ects.
As a complement to the Poisson estimates we report results of speci…cation (2) based on a zero-in ‡ated Poisson model in the second panel of Table 2 . The results are not substantially a¤ected by this change of estimator. Our main coe¢ cients of interest, on the tax index and on the interaction of the tax index with the EG index, have similar magnitudes across the two sets of results, and the signs are identical throughout. Table 3 presents estimation results for speci…cation (7) of the baseline model, which includes municipality …xed e¤ects in addition to the sector …xed e¤ects. The inclusion of municipality-speci…c e¤ects implies that we can no longer identify the coe¢ cients on variables that do not vary across sectors (tax index, property price, income tax, public expenditure, area, market potential, distance to highway). Any bias due to unobserved but relevant time and sector 3 3 We have also experimented with variables capturing municipality-level human capital (measured by average educational attainment). Educational attainment turns out to be strongly collinear with market potential, and inclusion of human-capital variables can yield negative estimated coe¢ cients on market potential. This is consistent with models in which centrality (generally implying location in an urban area) is attractive mainly because of the access it o¤ers to a skilled workforce and in spite of local congestion diseconomies (see, e.g., Combes, Duranton and Gobillon, 2008) . None of the remaining coe¢ cients are signi…cantly a¤ected when human capital is included. Results can be provided on request. invariant locational features, however, can now be avoided. 34 Our main interest concerns the interaction of the tax index with the EG index. The estimated coe¢ cients are somewhat smaller in magnitude, but they are again consistently positive; and, based on the robust variance estimators, statistical signi…cance is found in two out of the three regression runs. Our key result is thus con…rmed: the more agglomerated a sector, the less its …rms react to tax di¤erentials in choosing locations.
Parameter estimates with sector and location …xed e¤ects
In line with expectations, signi…cantly positive e¤ects are also found on the interaction of property price with the EG index, and on sector proximity. Neither the main e¤ect of wage nor its interaction with the EG index, however, is statistically signi…cant. This is not very surprising, as we observe wages only at the level of large regions and not of individual municipalities.
Importance of agglomeration on …rms'sensitivity to tax di¤erentials
The coe¢ cients reported in the …rst panel of Table 2 reveal that for a …rm in a sector with an EG index of zero, corporate taxes exert a statistically signi…cantly negative impact on location choice. We can quantify this e¤ect by computing the relative change in new …rm counts of a one-standard-deviation change in the tax index (see e.g. Winkelmann, 2000) :
The estimated parameters at the three-digit level, for example, imply that an increase in a municipality's tax index by one sample standard deviation (of 0.64) decreases the count of …rms in a sector with average agglomeration intensity (EG index of 0.013) setting up in that municipality by 3.8 percent.
For a weakly agglomerated sector, at the twentieth percentile of the sample distribution of the EG index, the tax deterrent e¤ect is considerably stronger, at -6.7 percent. Conversely, at the eightieth percentile of the distribution of the EG index, the impact of a one-standarddeviation increase in the tax index on the count of new …rms shrinks to -3.3 percent. Hence, location choices of …rms in sectors with an agglomeration intensity at the twentieth percentile of the sample distribution are twice as responsive to a given change in municipal corporate tax burdens as …rms in sectors with an agglomeration intensity at the eightieth percentile 3 4 One such feature might be the bureaucratic costs of registering a new …rm.
of the sample distribution. To give two examples, …rms in the software sector (NACE 722), whose EG index corresponds to the twentieth percentile, are predicted to be twice as sensitive to corporate tax di¤erentials as …rms in the specialized machinery sector (NACE 295), whose EG index corresponds to the eightieth percentile. Our results therefore imply di¤erences in locational sensitivities that are quantitatively important. 35 5.3 Speci…c model
Parameter estimates
The …rst panel of Table 4 reports our estimates of the speci…c model (5), with all coe¢ cients constrained to be equal across sectors (allowing us to report them in the table). Again, we …nd that high corporate taxes deter …rm births, with an e¤ect of the corporate income tax rate that is statistically signi…cantly negative across the three regression runs. Note that the positive coe¢ cient estimated on ln(1-t j ) implies that the e¤ect of the tax rate is negative.
The e¤ects of income tax and capital tax are also estimated to be negative. The e¤ect of capital taxes appears considerably weaker than that of corporate and personal income taxes.
This can probably be explained by the fact that capital taxes play a relatively minor role in the Swiss …scal system, accounting for a mere three percent of consolidated tax revenues at the sub-federal level (whereas corporate income taxes represent some twelve percent and personal income taxes about two thirds of total sub-federal revenues).
Conversely, agglomeration e¤ects, measured here as the coe¢ cient on the interaction between sector proximity and the EG index, are positive and statistically signi…cant (although with robust standard errors statistical signi…cance is found only at the three-digit level of sectoral aggregation). The remaining controls perform in line with expectations: a large area, high sector proximity and high market potential raise the number of new …rms, while a high average wage appears to be detrimental. The estimated coe¢ cients on property price are not statistically signi…cant, which is again suggestive of a dual role played by this variable, both as a factor price (which deters …rm births) and as a positive but imperfect correlate of unmeasured locational attractions (which promote …rm births), thus supporting inclusion of municipality …xed e¤ects to test the sensitivity of our parameters of main interest.
We then carry out a number of robustness tests on the regressions reported in the …rst panel of Table 4 .
In the second panel of Table 4 , we show results for the same speci…cation but estimated via zero-in ‡ated Poisson. The estimated coe¢ cients are stable, and the precision of the estimates is increased. In particular, we now …nd that the interaction between sector proximity and the EG index is statistically signi…cant at all levels of sectoral aggregation also when based on robust standard errors. Overall, therefore, even the constrained version of our speci…c model (in the sense that estimated coe¢ cients are forced to be equal across sectors) performs well.
The …rst panel of Table 5 reports estimates of a speci…cation that allows for sector-speci…c coe¢ cients on wage, property price and market potential and thereby gets closer to expression (5) . 36 Once more, our main results stand: high corporate and personal income taxes depress …rm births, whereas …rms in highly agglomerated sectors, measured by the EG index, choose locations with high sector proximity. Our qualitative results also hold once we force the coe¢ cients on area to unity, as suggested by the empirical model in Section 3.3.1. These estimates are reported in the second panel of Table 5 . 37 As another robustness test, we again introduce municipality …xed e¤ects. This no longer allows us to identify the e¤ect of the tax variables, but it serves as a check on the interaction between sector proximity and the EG index in a speci…cation that controls for all potential municipality-level determinants of …rm births. Table 6 displays the results. We once more …nd positive estimates on the interaction of interest, with robust statistical signi…cance, however, found only at the three-digit level of sectoral aggregation.
Finally, we replace our statutory corporate tax variables with the tax index for corporate income and capital taxes as used in the baseline model. To use the tax index, while loosening the link to the speci…c model, has the advantage of capturing the full tax schedules better than statutory taxes for particular types of …rms and households. These results are reported in Table 7 (which apart from the modi…ed tax variables corresponds to the speci…cation reported on in Table 4 ). We …nd statistically signi…cant deterrent e¤ects of corporate and personal income taxes across the board. All remaining coe¢ cients, including those on the agglomeration variables, are very similar to those obtained in the estimations based on the tax index (Table 4 ). We therefore conclude that our results are not driven by any particular -and inevitably somewhat arbitrary -empirical representation of the relevant corporate and personal tax burdens.
Tax-versus-agglomeration e¤ect
Our speci…c model implies that the elasticity of pro…ts, and thus of new …rm counts, with respect to corporate income taxes is constant. Hence, unlike our baseline speci…cation (1), the speci…c model (5) does not feature an explicit interaction between taxes and agglomeration forces. However, the agglomeration force, i.e. the e¤ect on pro…ts of a large N ij , will be sector speci…c. According to equation (5), the total agglomeration e¤ect on pro…ts is @ ln i @ ln N i = 7 + 8 A i , which varies across sectors via the di¤erent agglomeration intensities A i . 38 Having estimated the parameters of equation (5), we will thus be able to compute how the sensitivity of pro…ts with respect to the local corporate tax index ( 2 ) varies relative to the elasticity of pro…t with respect to the number of proximate own-sector …rms:
where circum ‡exes denote estimated values.
An illustration of this e¤ect, based on the three-digit unconstrained Poisson results of Table 5 , is provided in Figure 9 . Con…dence intervals are computed using the delta method, based alternatively on unadjusted and on robust Poisson standard errors. The illustration shows that the relative importance of tax di¤erentials is some 2.5 times stronger for the least agglomerated sectors than for the most agglomerated sectors. 39 We again …nd, therefore, that the intensity of agglomeration a¤ects the relative importance of tax di¤erentials in determining …rms'location choices to a quantitatively signi…cant extent.
Conclusions
Drawing on a …rm-level dataset for Switzerland and employing …xed-e¤ects count-data estimation techniques, we …nd that …rm births on average react negatively to corporate tax burdens, but that the deterrent e¤ect of taxes is signi…cantly weaker in sectors that are more spatially concentrated. This …nding supports the validity of recent theoretical results suggesting that agglomeration economies can reduce the importance of tax di¤erentials for …rms' location choices and thereby lessen the intensity of corporate tax competition even if technological and administrative barriers to capital mobility are low.
In a sense, this research constitutes but the …rst step in a full evaluation of the prediction that agglomeration forces mitigate 'race-to-the-bottom'tax competition. Although tax competition is often at its …ercest when targeted at new …rms, it could be useful to explore how tax di¤erentials a¤ect not just births but the entire life cycle of …rms, including expansions, contractions and deaths. In future work it will furthermore be interesting to study whether policy makers recognize the di¤erential impact of …scal inducements across sectors and e¤ectively tax agglomeration rents, and whether this e¤ect is strong enough to have a noticeable impact on the evolution of statutory corporate tax burdens.
Figure 1: Profit Tax Rates Across Swiss Cantons
Notes: Cantonal and municipal statutory profit tax rates on a representative firm with 2% return on capital. Cantonal averages over all of the canton's sample municipalities in 1998. Blue areas are lakes. 
Figure 2: Corporate Tax Burdens (Tax Index) Across Swiss Cantons
Notes:
The graph illustrates the relative effect of taxes compared to the impact of supplier access as a function of the degree of agglomeration at the NACE three-digit sector level. The underlying computations are based on the coefficients in Table 5 . 
Constrained Poisson
Notes : * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; standard errors in parentheses; robust standard errors in parentheses and italics for Poisson model; bootstrapped standard error were used to calculate Chi2-stat; bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses and italics for constrained Poisson. Coefficient on log area constrained to one in constrained regressions. Notes : * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; standard errors in parentheses; robust standard errors in parentheses and italics. 
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